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NOAH McKAY
PROBLEMS WITH THE 
“PROBLEMS” WITH 
PSYCHOPHYSICAL CAUSATION
ABSTRACT
In this essay, I defend a mind-body dualism, according to which human 
minds are immaterial substances that exercise non-redundant causal powers 
over bodies, against the notorious problem of psychophysical causation. I 
explicate and reply to three formulations of the problem: (i) the claim that, on 
dualism, psychophysical causation is inconsistent with physical causal closure, 
(ii) the claim that psychophysical causation on the dualist view is intolerably 
mysterious, and (iii) Jaegwon Kim’s claim that dualism fails to account for 
causal pairings. Ultimately, I conclude that these objections fail and that 
dualist interactionism is no more problematic or mysterious than  
physical causation.
I. INTRODUCTION: REVIVING 
DESCARTES’S DEAD HORSE
In 1643, René Descartes, that venerated defender of the immaterial 
soul, received a letter from Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, demanding 
that he explain “how the human soul can determine the movement 
of the animal spirits in the body so as to perform voluntary acts—
being as it is merely a conscious substance.”1 This question, and 
others like it, have proven notoriously problematic for proponents of 
dualist interactionism. Psychophysical causation, causation of physical 
events by mental events, within a substance-dualist framework is 
widely thought to be inexplicable, mysterious, and inconsistent with a 
properly scientific view of the world, and this is taken to be a serious—
indeed, a lethal—defect in the Cartesian account. In Jaegwon Kim’s 
words, Cartesianism “founders on the rock of mental causation.”2 
In this essay, I will respond to various formulations of the problem 
of psychophysical causation from a dualist perspective. The dualism 
I represent is a broadly Cartesian substance-dualist interactionism 
(hereafter simply “dualism”) according to which (i) human minds 
are immaterial, non-spatial, non-composite substances, (ii) mental 
properties and events are irreducibly mental—that is, they are not 
identical with, nor are they in any way reducible to, physical properties 
or events—and (iii) that some physical events are caused by mental, 
rather than physical, events (and vice-versa)—in sum, the archaic and 
very unfashionable position that the human person is, in Gilbert Ryle’s 
deliberately abusive terminology, a “Ghost in [a] Machine.”3 I do not 
1 David Robb and John Heil, “Mental Causation,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified October 10, 2018, https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/.
2 Jaegwon Kim, “The Nonreductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation,” 
in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 339.
3 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1949), 16. 
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pretend that psychophysical causation is the only problem with which 
dualism so characterized must grapple, nor do I intend to offer positive 
argumentation for dualism in this essay. I wish simply to remove what 
is probably the most serious and definitely the historically predominant 
obstacle to those considering dualism. 
II. THREE FORMULATIONS OF THE 
PROBLEM
In this section, I will present explanations of and responses to three 
different versions of the problem of psychophysical causation: (i) the 
claim that, on dualism, psychophysical causation is inconsistent with 
physical causal closure (the “Closure Problem”); (ii) the claim that 
psychophysical causation on the dualist view is intolerably mysterious 
(the “Mystery Problem”); and (iii) Jaegwon Kim’s contention that 
dualism fails to account for causal pairings (the “Pairing Problem.”)
A. THE CLOSURE PROBLEM
First, many philosophers find dualism problematic in that it 
conflicts with the principle of the causal closure of the physical world. 
This principle is formulated by Jaegwon Kim:
The causal closure of the physical domain: If a physical event has a cause 
at t, then it has a physical cause at t.4
Causal closure boils down to the claim that any physical event can 
be explained solely in terms of other physical events. If this is true, 
it poses a problem for the dualist, for if some physical event, E, has a 
sufficient mental cause, M, at some time, t (which is indeed often true 
if dualism is true,) then E also has a sufficient physical cause, P, at t. 
However, this means that E has more than one sufficient cause; that is, 
E is causally overdetermined. If we reject the possibility of genuine causal 
overdetermination—as nearly all philosophers of mind do as two events 
cannot both be the cause of something, since that would be redundant—
this means that only one of either P or M caused E. Because causal 
closure dictates that E must have a physical cause, P must win out over 
M. This means that M is not causally efficacious in bringing about E; 
indeed, if causal closure is true (and causal overdetermination is rejected), 
no mental event ever causes any physical event to occur.
The heart of the problem here is obvious: the causal closure 
principle constitutes a flat denial of the dualist’s thesis that non-
This description should be taken to exclude the “non-reductive” materialist’s 
account of mental properties and events.
4 Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 15.
redundant, two-way causation occurs between the physical and mental 
domains. Causal closure is generally taken as an a priori premise in 
physicalist literature, and if it is so taken in the above argument, then 
the Closure Problem is question-begging: it presupposes the falsity of 
dualism from step one. 
Can the anti-dualist present some argument for causal closure? 
Although such arguments are seldom offered, they do exist and are 
typically built upon empirical considerations.5 Andrew Melnyk, for 
instance, offers an enumerative-inductive argument for causal closure 
from the prior success of science in uncovering purely physical causes 
for previously unexplained phenomena.6 If science hasn’t met with 
immaterial causes in past cases, it probably will not meet with them 
in future cases—or so the argument goes. This case for causal closure 
seems to me to be very weak; the fact that science has, so far, uncovered 
purely physical explanations for an impressive number of physical 
phenomena does not mean that it will uncover such explanations for 
all physical phenomena. Such extrapolation-with-abandon on the part 
of the physicalist seems to me to be entirely unjustified and indeed 
nearly as question-begging as the bare assertion of causal closure. 
This is especially so since the philosophical literature abounds with 
positive arguments for dualism; dualists have offered warrant for belief 
in irreducibly mental events that causally influence the physical world 
and so have offered warrant for believing that future scientific research 
will not uncover exhaustive, purely physical causal explanations for all 
physical events. John Foster argues that, given the relative meagerness 
of scientists’ understanding of brain function, and given pre-scientific 
considerations offered in support of dualism, the sort of evidence that 
Melnyk appeals to “simply does not support the conclusion that the 
brain functions in a way which could be wholly accounted for (even 
from a God’s-eye view) on the basis of its physical character and 
physical laws.”7 
Furthermore, I think we ought to be skeptical of claims made by 
the likes of Melnyk that science is marching forward in inexorable 
progress against the immaterial. Many reputable theistic—and even 
non-theistic—philosophers and scientists in the last few decades 
have drawn attention to phenomena in cosmology, microbiology, 
and genetics which appear to defy naturalistic explanation and which 
seem to accord better with what Richard Swinburne terms personal 
5 Justin Tiehen, “Explaining Causal Closure,” Philosophical Studies : An 
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 172, no. 9 
(2015): 2418, doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0418-5. 
6 Andrew Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto; Thoroughly Modern Materialism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 289-90.
7 John Foster, The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist 
Conception of the Mind (London: Routledge, 200), 105.
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explanation: the fine-tuning of physical constants and quantities in the 
universe for the existence of conscious, interactive life, the information 
content of DNA sequences, and the enormous probabilistic difficulties 
facing naturalistic accounts of the origin of life, to name a few.8 
Whatever our estimation of theism, and whether or not we think that 
these phenomena are ultimately naturally explicable, we ought at least 
to admit that science is having a bit of a hard time subsuming these sorts 
of phenomena under purely physical causal explanations. Not only 
does Melnyk’s enumerative-inductive inference to causal closure reach 
far beyond what his premise justifies, but this premise itself is open to 
serious question. The Closure Problem, therefore, seems to me to be 
hopelessly weak at best and question-begging at worst.
It is worth noting at this point that some philosophers have 
formulated the problem of psychophysical causation in terms of energy 
conservation, arguing that dualistic psychophysical causation would 
“create” new energy in the human brain, thereby violating fundamental 
physical laws.9 This formulation of the problem is, I submit, little more 
than a narrowing of the Closure Problem, since conservation laws 
apply only to causally closed systems, and so any anti-dualist appealing 
to conservation laws must beg the question by presupposing causal 
closure. This is certainly not the only defect in these arguments (Robin 
Collins has discussed others), but it is decisive in my view.10
B. THE MYSTERY PROBLEM
Second, the problem of psychophysical causation might be put as 
the objection that psychophysical causation on dualism is somehow 
mysterious to an intolerable degree; this is probably the most prevalent 
version of the problem in the philosophical literature. I will address 
three ways in which the “Mystery Problem” might be formulated: 
first, it might be formulated as the objection that dualists are unable to 
provide an adequate mechanism for psychophysical causation; second, it 
8 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2004), 35-38. See Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, 
Religion, and Naturalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Antony 
Flew and Roy Abraham Varghese, There is a God: How the World’s Most 
Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind (New York: HarperOne, 2007); and 
Stephen Meyer, Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent 
Design (New York: HarperOne, 2009) for interesting discussions of these 
problems by credentialed philosophers. 
9 Howard Robinson, “Dualism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last 
modified February 29, 2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/.
10  See Robbin Collins, “Modern Physics and the Energy-Conservation 
Objection to Mind-Body Dualism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 
45, no. 1 (Jan. 2008): 31-42. Collins argues that energy conservation 
laws are not universally generalizable, since they do not apply in General 
Relativity theory, and that quantum mechanics sets a precedent for causal 
interaction without energy transfer.
might be formulated as the objection that dualism posits unintelligible 
causal relations between radically different kinds of substances; third, 
it might be put as the objection that dualist psychophysical causation is 
exceedingly strange and wholly unfamiliar to us, and should therefore be 
eliminated in favor of more familiar (i.e. physical) causes. 
The first instance of the Mystery Problem objects that no 
mechanism for dualist psychophysical causation is available—that is, 
we cannot think of how mental events might cause physical events. 
This objection fails, for no matter what account of causation the anti-
dualist espouses, he must posit a great number of instances of causation 
for which no mechanism can be provided, for which no how can be 
given. For he must inevitably admit immediate causation at some level. 
Consider a commonplace example of physical causation: the throwing 
of a baseball causing the shattering of a window. It will be helpful, both 
for clarity and for precision, to represent this event by the following 
finite series:
P1 →  P2 → P3… Pn-1 → Pn
In this series, each term stands for a physical event, and “→” stands for 
“causes.”  The first term, P1, stands for the throwing of the baseball, 
and the last term, Pn, stands for the shattering of the window. The 
terms in between stand for all of the events in the causal chain between 
P1 and Pn—for instance, the flying of the baseball through the air, the 
contact of the baseball with the glass, etc.11 Presumably, providing a 
mechanism by which P1 causes Pn consists of identifying and describing 
the intervening events between P1 and Pn in the above series. In other 
words, to provide a mechanism is to describe precisely what happened 
between P1 and Pn. (Allegedly, this is necessary to give an explanation 
for how P1 caused Pn.)  I do not know how else one might construe 
“mechanism” in this objection; it cannot refer to a literal mechanical, 
chemical, or micro-physical apparatus since many instances of physical 
causation—such as a baseball’s shattering of a window—do not involve 
any mediating apparatus. Furthermore, by describing the intervening 
events between P1 and Pn, we would describe the operation of any 
apparatus involved.
Now, if the above series is finite, then the causal relation 
(represented by “→”) between any one of the events in the series and 
the event directly following it must be immediate; that is, there must 
be no mechanism by which one event causes the next, since there are 
no intervening events between them. Nothing happens between, say, 
P1 and P2. There is no how. So the principle behind this version of the 
Mystery Problem applies equally to purely physical causation—indeed, 
11 These events can be taken as physical events of any sort, as complex or 
as basic, as enduring or as fleeting, as you like; my argument works at any 
level of reduction.
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to causation of any kind. In Foster’s words, “presumably the notion of 
direct causation is not as such problematic: indeed, whenever causation 
operates, there has to be some direct causation.”12 The dualist is free to 
say that, when a mental event causes a physical event, the last mental 
event in the causal series causes the first physical event in the series 
immediately, without any intervening causes; only a “→” separates 
them. And, no charge can be brought against them that cannot also be 
brought against one who claims that baseballs shatter windows.
But what if the number of events in the causal series is infinite 
such that, for any two events in the series, there is always at least one 
intervening event between them? While this proposal might eliminate 
immediate causation, it ultimately renders provision of a mechanism 
for any instance of causation impossible, because it is impossible 
to enumerate and describe each of the infinitely many intervening 
events between two events in the series. We might try to solve this by 
subsuming every intervening event between P₁ and Pn under a single 
term, PS, so that all of the infinitely many events between them are 
summarized as “the baseball flew through the air and collided with the 
window.” However, the same problem arises here as with a finite series: 
no mechanism has been provided by which P1 caused PS or by which 
PS caused Pn. Thus, the positing of infinite causal series does nothing to 
strengthen the objection.
Second, the Mystery Problem might be taken as the charge that 
dualist psychophysical causation is implausible in that it posits causal 
relations between two fundamentally different kinds of things, things 
which, in Howard Robinson’s word, “lack that communality necessary 
for interaction.”13 The assumption here is that the mind, in order 
to interact causally with physical objects, must share a certain set of 
characteristics with those objects, or that it must belong to the same 
ontological “realm.” In response, the dualist might ask: why? Why 
think that causation could not occur between two things with radically 
different characteristics or belonging to different ontological categories? 
The anti-dualist might point out that familiar cases of causal interaction 
between physical objects would be impossible unless all of the objects 
in question shared certain properties, such as spatial location and 
extension. And since the dualist’s immaterial ego does not share these 
properties, this excludes it from causal interactions with physical things. 
However, it is hard to see how this follows: after all, the dualist does not 
assert that psychophysical causation is anything like physical-to-physical 
causation. If the anti-dualist’s claim is that immaterial minds cannot 
stand in the same sorts of causal relations in which physical things stand 
to one another (or in which mental events stand to one another), his 
12  Foster, The Immaterial Self, 86.
13  Robinson, “Dualism.” 
claim is not very interesting; the dualist does not postulate that the 
causal relations between minds and bodies are of this sort. Furthermore, 
I do not see how an argument could be made that there cannot be any 
other sorts of causal relations; there is just no good reason to accept 
the claim that fundamentally different things cannot interact. In 
Kim’s estimation, this version of the Mystery Problem “is incomplete 
and unsatisfying. As it stands, it is not much of an argument; rather, 
it only expresses a vague, inchoate dissatisfaction.”14 As it turns out, 
this objection begs the question against the dualist’s thesis that causal 
relations do, in fact, bridge ontological realms.
Third, the Mystery Problem might be put as the objection that 
psychophysical causation is exceedingly strange or unfamiliar to us 
relative to physical-to-physical causation and so ought to be jettisoned 
in favor of the latter. It might be argued that physical causation is the 
most credible explanatory resource we have, since we are constantly 
surrounded by it; we are much better acquainted with it than with 
any ghostly causal powers that the dualist might posit. So, we ought 
to eliminate such unfamiliar causes in favor of purely physical ones 
whenever possible—which turns out to be always. The Mystery 
Problem in this form is question-begging in two ways: first, it begs 
the question against the dualist’s claim that psychophysical causation is 
explanatorily indispensable; second, if dualism is true, every one of us is 
intimately acquainted with psychophysical causation, since we engage 
in it moment-by-moment. Indeed, if dualism is true, then we are 
arguably more familiar with psychophysical causation than we are with 
physical causation; there is nothing unfamiliar or mysterious about it. 
The anti-dualist could only deny this by presupposing dualism to  
be false.
The Mystery Problem is bankrupt. In fact, it is a pseudo-problem; 
that is, the dualist need not worry about solving it, because there is not 
even a problem to solve. Mental-to-physical causation on dualism is no 
more mysterious, implausible, or inexplicable than physical-to-physical 
causation.
C. THE PAIRING PROBLEM 
In his book, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim 
offers a version of the problem of psychophysical causation that he calls 
the “Pairing Problem:”
Let us begin with a simple example of physical causation: two guns, A and 
B, are simultaneously fired, and this results in the simultaneous death of 
two persons, Adam and Bob. What makes it the case that the firing of A 
caused Adam’s death and the firing of B caused Bob’s death, and not the 
14  Kim, Physicalism, 74.
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other way around? What are the principles that underlie the correct and 
incorrect pairings of cause and effect in a situation like this?15
Kim’s answer: A stood in certain spatial relations to Adam at the 
moment it was fired that B did not, such that the bullet fired from A 
rather than from B killed Adam, and likewise for B and Bob. Kim goes 
on to argue that, since souls are not located in space, the dualist cannot 
give a similar explanation of why certain souls cause physical events in 
certain bodies, rather than others. After all, we can imagine a scenario 
in which two souls in qualitatively identical states cause qualitatively 
identical physical events in qualitatively identical bodies. Which soul 
caused which event in which body? Since neither soul is in space, the 
dualist cannot appeal to spatial relations to answer this question. In 
order to account for the pairings, the dualist needs some relation, R, 
analogous to a spatial relation, in which each soul stands to only one 
body. According to Kim, they do not have one.16 As it turns out, Kim 
intends this as a more rigorous formulation of the third version of the 
Mystery Problem above; since souls are dissimilar to physical things in 
that they are non-spatial, they cannot interact with them.
The pairing problem is open to multiple objections (some of 
which Foster has enumerated), but I will focus on what I take to the 
most lethal: I contend that the dualist may properly take R to be a 
basic relation, that is, a relation that cannot be analyzed or explained in 
terms of other relations, and so Kim’s demand for a description or an 
analysis of such a relation from the dualist is unreasonable.17 When the 
physicalist asks, “How is it that certain bodies are united with certain 
minds and not with others?” the dualist may justifiably answer, “They 
just are.” They need go no further than saying that one soul in the 
above example does, in fact, stand in some relation R to one body in 
which the other soul does not stand to that body that accounts for the  
relevant pairing. 
Kim objects to this answer: “For it concedes that the notion of 
‘union’ of a mind and a body, and hence the notion of a person, is 
unintelligible. For what is it for a wholly immaterial thing to be ‘united’ 
or ‘joined’ with a material body with a specific location in space? The 
word ‘united’ merely gives a name to a mystery rather than clarifying 
it.”18 This is false; to admit that R is unanalyzable is not to admit that 
it is unintelligible. Even if the dualist cannot analyze R in terms of 
other more basic relations, this is unproblematic, for neither can this 
15 Kim, Physicalism, 78-79.
16 Kim, Physicalism, 79-80.
17 See Foster, The Immaterial Self, 87-91. Foster contends that it is 
conceivable that indeterministic physical laws might result in a similar 
pairing problem for physical causation, and so the physicalist faces the 
same difficulty.
18 Kim, Physicalism, 78.
be done, ultimately, with the spatial relations that determine physical 
causal pairings. For instance, if we start with spatial contiguity as our 
candidate for this relation, we can analyze it in terms of distance and 
direction, and perhaps these can be analyzed in terms of more basic 
spatial relations. But if contiguity is to be defined non-circularly, Kim’s 
analysis must eventually terminate in some basic spatial relation R* that 
is unanalyzable in terms of other relations, just as R for the dualist is 
unanalyzable.19 To put it another way, the dualist might ask, “How is 
it that bullet B stands in the relation of spatial contiguity to Bob, but 
A does not?” to which Kim might answer, “Because bullet B stands in 
such-and-such more basic spatial relations to Bob, which bullet A does 
not.” However, Kim cannot keep this up forever. The dualist can ask 
the same question about these more basic relations, and eventually Kim 
will have to answer, “It just does.”  
This does not mean, of course, that R*, whatever it is, is 
unintelligible: Kim may clarify R* by pointing to examples in the 
physical world where R* is exemplified, such as the rifle example. 
In the same way, the dualist may point to examples in which R is 
exemplified: each of us is one such example. Further, he can make 
intelligible claims about R; namely, that it is the relation in which one’s 
mind stands to one’s body such that the former is able to cause changes 
in the latter and vice-versa. A similar claim could be made about R*. 
So, Kim is in the same boat as the dualist: physical causal pairings are 
ultimately determined by unanalyzable spatial relations that can only 
be clarified by example. The pairing problem, then, turns out to be 
another pseudo-problem, as it ascribes unintelligibility to unanalyzable 
relations, when in fact such relations can be perfectly intelligible and 
must be countenanced by any account of causation, including Kim’s.
CONCLUSION
The above formulations of the problem of psychophysical causation 
are entirely unsuccessful as refutations of dualism. Those of them that are 
not question-begging can be applied with equal force against any account 
of physical causation. Cartesianism has not foundered on the rocks just 
yet; if it is to run aground, it must be elsewhere.
19 It is technically untrue that such an analysis must terminate in an 
unanalyzable spatial relation: R* might be analyzed in terms of causal 
relations. That is, an object A might be said to stand in R* to an object B 
iff A stands in such-and-such causal relations to B. But if R* is analyzed 
in terms of causal relations, it cannot serve to determine causal pairings, 
since it presupposes them.
St
an
ce
 V
ol
um
e 
12
 / 
Ap
ril 
20
19
42
Ps
yc
ho
ph
ys
ica
l C
au
sa
tio
n
43
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Noah McKay is a sophomore at 
Covenant College in Lookout 
Mountain, Georgia, majoring 
in philosophy and minoring in 
theology. His philosophic interests 
include (but are certainly not limited 
to) analytic philosophy of religion, 
philosophy of mind, and mereology. 
His greatest aspiration is to teach 
and write philosophy professionally.
